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WHAT CONSTITUTES A "NEW USE" OF A
KNOWN COMPOSITION AND SHOULD A




This Article examines the long-standing patent principle that
new uses directed to a result or property of a known composition are
not patentable. The Article demonstrates that this principle is closely
related to another well-known patent principle, namely that an alleged
infringer's intent when performing a claimed method is irrelevant for
purposes of determining infringement. To demonstrate the
relationship between these two principles, the Article examines the
recent Federal Circuit case of Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, which
distinguished a claim directed to a method of using a composition
over an allegedly infringing new use of the composition by construing
the claimed method as limited to achieving a particular objective.
The Article suggests that Jansen placed too much emphasis on the
alleged infringer's intent when performing the claimed method, and
that the decision stands as a dangerous precedent that a method of
using an old composition may be patentable simply by reciting a new
property of the composition or a different purpose for using it.
t The author is an associate in the Litigation, Intellectual Property & Antitrust group at
Hunton & Williams, LLP in Washington, D.C. His practice focuses in all areas of intellectual
property with particular emphasis on patent procurement and litigation for biotechnology
clients. After earning a B.S. in both Genetics and Microbiology from the University of Georgia
in 1998, he was a graduate student in the Microbiology & Immunology Department at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill until 2000. He earned his J.D. from the University
of California at Davis in 2003, where he served as the Executive Editor of the U.C. Davis Law
Review.
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"NEW USE" OF A KNOWN COMPOSITION
INTRODUCTION
Patents are an important means of protecting key scientific
discoveries. Patentees are encouraged to disclose to the public their
discoveries and, in turn, are awarded a limited monopoly in order to
recoup the expenses associated with discovery and to turn a profit.
There are, however, important checks on a patentee's ability to obtain
such a monopoly. One such check is the requirement that all
patentable inventions be novel. In the biotechnological context,
courts have long applied this novelty requirement to preclude the
patenting of so-called "new" uses of a known composition, where the
"new" use is merely the recognition of an inherent property of that
composition. Where one use already exists for a known composition,
any "new" use of the composition is deemed to be anticipated by the
old use, provided the composition is used in precisely the same
manner as it always has been. A hypothetical illustrates this point.
Suppose that after years of research, Inventor 1 discovers that
compound X, a compound well known in the art, is useful for treating
arthritis. Inventor 1 subsequently obtains a patent claiming a method
of using the compound to treat arthritis. The claim recites, "A method
of treating arthritis, comprising intravenously administering between
1 and 100 milligrams of compound X to a patient in need thereof."
Now suppose that Inventor 2, using compound X to treat arthritis,
discovers that the compound is also useful for treating near-
sightedness. May Inventor 2 obtain a pitent claiming, "A method of
treating near-sightedness, comprising intravenously administering
between 1 and 100 milligrams of compound X to a patient in need
thereof'? According to the general rule that new uses directed to a
result or property of a known composition are not patentable, the
answer should be no.
A recent Federal Circuit case, however, has suggested that a
claim directed to a method of using an old composition for one
purpose might be patentably distinct over a claim directed to the same
method for an unrelated purpose. This Article begins by surveying
the cases applying the long-standing principle that a claim directed to
a new use of a known composition, where the "new" use is merely the
recognition of an inherent property of that composition, is
unpatentable over a reference disclosing the same composition used
the same way. The Article then reviews the principle articulated by
the Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-
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Jenkinson Co.,' and endorsed by the Supreme Court, that an alleged
infringer's intent when performing a claimed method is irrelevant for
purposes of determining infringement. The Article proposes that
these two principles are not only consistent, they are actually two
sides of the same coin.
To demonstrate the relationship between these two principles,
the Article examines the recent Federal Circuit case of Jansen v.
Rexall Sundown,2 which distinguished a method of use claim over an
allegedly infringing use by construing the claimed method as limited
to achieving a particular objective. The Article argues that this
decision was wrongly reasoned on several grounds, not the least of
which is that it ignored the principle that a patentable new use of a
known composition requires more than the recognition of a result or
property of that composition. In so doing, the court read into the
claimed method a dubious intent limitation to distinguish it from the
allegedly infringing use. Consequently, the court's strained claim
construction also runs afoul of Warner-Jenkinson.
Unless and until the Federal Circuit clarifies the law in this area,
Jansen stands as a dangerous precedent that a method of using an old
composition may be patentable simply by reciting a new property of
the composition or a different purpose for using it. As such, the case
stands in direct contradiction to Warner-Jenkinson, which eschews
reading intent into claims.
I. NEW USES DIRECTED TO A RESULT OR PROPERTY OF A KNOWN
COMPOSITION ARE INHERENTLY ANTICIPATED
The discovery of a new use for an old composition based on
unknown properties of the composition might be patentable to the
discoverer as a process of use.3 However, when the claim recites
using an old composition and the "use" is directed to a result or
property of that composition, then the claim is inherently anticipated.4
Cases from the Federal Circuit, its predecessor court, the Court of
1. 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds,
520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
2. 342 F.3d 1329, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
3. See, e.g., In re Hack, 245 F.2d 246, 248, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 161, 163 (C.C.P.A.
1957); see also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2112 (2003) [hereinafter
M.P.E.P.].
4. A claim is inherently anticipated if each and every element as set forth in the claim is
found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See, e.g.,
M.P.E.P. § 2131.01.
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Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), and the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences affirming this basic principle of patent law
are particularly instructive in this regard.
A. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Cases
In In re Tomlinson,5 the patentee sought to patent a method of
inhibiting light degradation of polypropylene by mixing it with one of
a genus of compounds, including nickel dithiocarbamate. A prior art
reference taught mixing polypropylene with nickel dithiocarbamate to
lower heat degradation but made no mention of the degradative
effects caused by light. The CCPA held that the patentee's claim read
on the obvious process of mixing polypropylene with the nickel
dithiocarbamate. 6 The court found that the preamble of the claim,
"[a] process of inhibiting degradation of polypropylene caused by
exposure to light," did not patentably distinguish the claim from the
prior art because "[t]hat language, in effect, states the result of
admixing the two materials."7  The court continued, "While the
references do not show a specific recognition of that result, its
discovery by appellants is tantamount only to finding a property in
the old composition."
8
5. 363 F.2d 928, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
6. Id. at 934, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 628.
7. Id.
8. Id. (emphasis added). In In re Zierden, 411 F.2d 1325, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 102
(C.C.P.A. 1969), decided just three years after Tomlinson, the CCPA reached a different
conclusion than Tomlinson on seemingly analogous facts. In Zierden, the claim at issue was
directed to using a composition for "removing and preventing alluvium deposits in water
systems." Id. at 1326, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 103. The Board found the patent anticipated and/or
obvious in view of a patent disclosing the use of the same composition to prevent scale
formation in "industrial waters" and secondary references disclosing that all industrial water
systems contain alluvium deposits. Reversing the Board, the CCPA construed the term "water
systems" as "water systems containing alluvium," and held that the claim was valid because the
prior art did not disclose water systems containing alluvium. Id. Although Zierden took pains to
distinguish Tomlinson, the only true distinction between the cases is how the courts chose to
interpret the claims. Zierden's construction of the claim term "water systems" to mean "water
systems containing alluvium" is troubling. There is typically a heavy presumption that the
words of patent claims should be given their ordinary meaning. In this case, the ordinary
meaning of "water systems" would encompass any system of water, not just those which happen
to contain alluvium. In effect, the court redrafted Zierden's claim in order to distinguish the art.
This is precisely what Tomlinson refused to do. Tomlinson could equally well have read the
claim term "polypropylene" as meaning "polypropylene exposed to light," and held that the
prior art did not disclose such a compound. Tomlinson, however, rightly declined to engage in
judicial draftsmanship when the ordinary meaning of the claim term was so clear.
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In In re Best,9 a claim was directed to a method of preparing a
hydrolytically-stable zeolitic aluminosilicate, which included "cooling
the steamed zeolite ... at a rate sufficiently rapid that the cooled
zeolite exhibits an X-ray powder diffraction pattern."' 0 The Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences ("Board") sustained the Examiner's
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 rejection of the claim based on an issued
U.S. patent to Hansford which expressly disclosed all the method
limitations except for the cooling step. The Board concluded that the
cooling step, though not expressly disclosed by Hansford, was
nonetheless inherent in Hansford's method. On appeal, the CCPA
affirmed the Board's decision, holding that any sample of Hansford's
zeolite would necessarily be cooled to facilitate subsequent
handling." In so holding, the court stated, "[I]t is elementary that the
mere recitation of a newly discovered function or property, inherently
possessed by things in the prior art, does not cause a claim drawn to
those things to distinguish over the prior art."
12
In In re May,13 claims were directed to a method of effecting
nonaddictive analgesia (pain reduction) in animals by administering
to an animal an effective dosage of certain compounds. The Board
found that the claims were anticipated by a prior art reference, May,
which disclosed the same compounds for effecting analgesia, but
which was silent as to addiction. On appeal, appellants argued that
May did not anticipate the claim because it was directed to effecting
analgesia generally, whereas the claim was directed to effecting
nonaddictive analgesia. Relying on 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), which states
that "[t]he term 'process'. . . includes a new use of a known...
composition of matter," appellants argued that they had discovered a
new use for a known compound. 14  The CCPA disagreed with
appellants and affirmed the Board's holding. The court held that,
"[w]hile the applicants have discovered a hitherto unknown property,
to wit, nonaddictiveness, of the species disclosed by May, such
discovery does not constitute a new use."'
15
9. 562 F.2d 1252, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
10. Id. at 1253, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 431.
11. Id. at 1254, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 432-33.
12. Id, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 433 (citing In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 110, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
226 (C.C.P.A. 1971)) (emphasis added).
13. 574 F.2d 1082, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 601 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1999).
15. 574 F.2d at 1090, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 607 (emphasis added).
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B. Federal Circuit Case Law
The Federal Circuit has consistently reiterated the holdings of
the CCPA. In Mehi/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum,16 the
court found claims directed to a method for removing hair using a
laser anticipated by a reference that inherently taught removing hair
using a laser. The patent in dispute, U.S. Patent No. 5,059,192,
claimed a method for destroying the papilla, germ cells from which
hairs grow, using a Q-switched ruby laser, thereby preventing hair
regrowth. The district court found that the patent was anticipated by
an instruction manual for a Spectrum RD-1200 laser. The manual
taught the use of a Q-switched ruby laser to remove tattoos. A second
reference (the "Polla article"), which the district court did not rely on,
documented the tissue damage induced by Q-switched ruby laser
pulses in black, brown, and albino control guinea pigs.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding of
anticipation, but disagreed with the court's rationale. The court held
that the RD-1200 manual could not anticipate the '192 patent because
it did not teach all of the limitations of the claimed invention.' 7 Claim
I of the patent required a step of "aligning a laser light applicator
substantially vertically over a hair follicle opening."' 8  The court
found that the manual did not discuss hair follicles and thus did not
teach alignment substantially vertically over a follicle opening. 19 Nor
did the manual inherently teach this limitation of the claimed
invention because "the natural result flowing from the operation as
taught would result in the performance of the questioned function." 20
Instead, the court found that the claims were anticipated by the
Polla article. The court noted that Polla was replete with references to
the irradiation of hair follicles and, unlike the RD-1200 manual,
16. 192 F.3d 1362, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
17. Id. at 1365, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1306.
18. Id. at 1364, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1306.
19. Id. at 1365, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1306.
20. Id. In its holding, the court cited an earlier Federal Circuit case, In re King, 801 F.2d
1324, 1326, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In King, claims were directed to a
method of enhancing color effects produced by ambient light through a process of absorption
and reflection of the light off a coated substrate. The Board found the claims anticipated by a
reference disclosing the coated substrate to produce architectural colors, but not the absorption
and reflection mechanisms of the claimed process. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
finding that the prior art device inherently performed the function disclosed in King's method
claims when that device was used in normal and usual operation. Id. at 1327, 231 U.S.P.Q. at
136. The court held, "[u]nder the principles of inherency, if a structure in the prior art
necessarily functions in accordance with the limitations of a process or method claim of an
application, the claim is anticipated." Id. at 1326, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 136.
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inherently disclosed an "aligning" step.21 The record showed "that
holding the collimated laser in contact with the skin would align it
perpendicular to the skin surface and therefore substantially vertically
over follicle openings. 22  Thus, viewed as a whole, the Polla
disclosure showed that the "'natural result flowing from the operation
as taught would result in' alignment of the laser light over the hair
follicle, as claimed., 23  This was true even though Polla did not
concern itself with human skin nor mention the goal of hair
removal.
24
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. ,25 the Federal
Circuit, for the second time, found no patentable distinction between a
claim directed to a method of blocking serotonin uptake by use of
fluoxetine hydrochloride and a claim directed to a method of treating
anxiety in humans with fluoxetine hydrochloride. In that case, Lilly
charged Barr with infringing its U.S. Patent No. 4,626,549 by Barr's
filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") with the
Food and Drug Administration seeking approval to market a generic
version of Lilly's profitable drug, Prozac. The '549 patent claimed a
method of blocking the uptake of serotonin by brain neurons in
animals by administering the compound fluoxetine hydrochloride, the
active ingredient in Prozac. The district court granted Lilly's motions
for summary judgment that the patents-in-suit were not invalid for
double patenting.
On appeal, a Federal Circuit panel reversed the district court,
specifically finding that the '549 patent was invalid.26 Lilly petitioned
for rehearing, and the Federal Circuit, acting en banc, vacated the
panel's decision and reassigned the opinion to the panel for revision
of the double-patenting section.27 In its second opinion, the panel
again held that the '549 patent claim was invalid, but this time in view
of claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,590,213.28 Claim 1 of the '213 patent
was directed to "[a] method for treating anxiety in a human subject in
need of such treatment which comprises the administration to such
human [of] an effective amount of fluoxetine or norfluoxetine or
21. Mehl/Biophile Int'l Corp., 192 F.3d at 1365-66,52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1306.
22. Id. at 1366, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1306.
23. Id. (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323, 326
(C.C.P.A. 1981)).
24. Id. at 1366, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1306-07.
25. 251 F.3d 955, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 958-59, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1870.
27. Id. at 958, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1870.
28. Id. at 972, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1879-80.
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pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof."29 The panel noted that the
only difference between claim 1 of the '213 patent and claim 7 of the
'549 patent was that the former addressed a method of treating
anxiety in humans with fluoxetine hydrochloride while the latter
claimed a method of using fluoxetine hydrochloride to block
serotonin uptake in animals.3°
The panel next addressed whether the difference between the
claims at issue rendered the claims patentably distinct. It stated, "In
this case, it is clear from all of the evidence proffered by Barr that the
natural result flowing from administration of fluoxetine hydrochloride
is inhibition of serotonin uptake." 3' Thus, the panel concluded that
"the limitation of claim 7 of the '549 patent directed to blocking
serotonin uptake by use of fluoxetine hydrochloride is an inherent
characteristic of the administration of fluoxetine hydrochloride for
any purpose, including the treatment of anxiety. 3 2 Accordingly, the
panel found no patentable distinction between the claims of the '213
patent and the '549 patent and held claim 7 of the '549 patent invalid
for double patenting.33
That same year, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue
Laboratories, Inc.,34 the Federal Circuit found a claim directed to a
method of treating cancer comprising certain steps anticipated by a
reference disclosing the same steps, but which had not observed any
anticancer effects. Bristol held patents covering a three-hour
administration of the antitumor drug paclitaxel. One of the patents
claimed, "[a] method for treating a patient suffering from a taxol-
sensitive tumor comprising (i) premedicating said patient with a
medicament that reduces or eliminates hypersensitivity reactions, and
29. Id. at 962, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1873.
30. Id. at 971, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1879.
31. Id. at 970, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1880.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 972, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1880. Lilly again petitioned for rehearing, and this time
the Federal Circuit acting en bane declined to rehear the case. Judge Newman, dissenting from
the refusal to reconsider, decried the panel's decision as reaching the anomalous conclusion that
the earlier filed '549 patent was invalid for double-patenting over the '213 patent that was filed
nine years later. She also criticized the panel's holding that "'the natural result of fluoxetine
hydrochloride is the inhibition of serotonin uptake,' and.., that a discovery of a new and
unobvious biological property is unpatentable because it is inherent in the chemical compound."
Id. at 976. Noting that every biological property is a natural and inherent result of the chemical
structure from which it arises, Judge Newman added, "To negate the patentability of a discovery
of biological activity because it is 'the natural result' of the chemical compound can have
powerful consequences for the patentability of biological inventions." Id.
34. 246 F.3d 1368, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
2005]
328 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 21
(ii) parenterally administering to said patient about 135-175 mg/m2
taxol over about three hours."
35
Ben Venue filed an ANDA, seeking approval to market
paclitaxel prior to the expiration of the two patents, and Bristol sued.
Following a claim construction hearing, the district court found the
claims anticipated over an article by Kris in which Kris treated
patients with three-hour infusions of paclitaxel within the claimed
dosage ranges, but observed no antitumor response. The district court
held that the claims were inherently anticipated "because reducing
toxicity and tumor regression were necessary consequences of
practicing the method steps of Kris.
' 36
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court.
Addressing Bristol's argument that new uses of old processes are
patentable, the court noted that "the claimed process here is not
directed to a new use; it is the same use, and it consists of the same
steps as described by Kris."3 7 The court concluded, "[a]lthough Kris
did not observe any anticancer effects ... the claims only require the
administration of specific amounts of paclitaxel and not the
achievement of a particular result., 38  Finding that Kris had
administered three-hour infusions of 135 mg/m2 paclitaxel to three
patients rnd 160 mg/m2 to four patients, the court concluded that
"Kris therefore performed all of the claimed steps at dosage levels
that anticipate those in the claims. 39
In Catalina Marketing International, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com,
Inc. ,4 the Federal Circuit cited Bristol-Myers for the proposition that
steps of a claimed method are performed the same way regardless of
whether, as stated in the preamble, a reduction in hematologic toxicity
occurs. In Catalina, the court held that phrases in apparatus claims
stating a different intended result are not limiting and, therefore do
not distinguish the prior art. Although this holding was limited to
apparatus claims, the court noted in dictum that the principle applies
equally well to method claims reciting the same steps of an old
method for a different purpose.4 1 The court proposed the following
hypothetical:
35. Id. at 1371, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1510.
36. Id. at 1373, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1511-12.
37. Id. at 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1514 (citing In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090, 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 601, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1978)) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 1378, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1515.
39. Id.
40. 289 F.3d 801,809, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, '785 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
41. Id. at 810, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1786.
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Inventor A invents a shoe polish for shining shoes (which, for the
sake of example, is novel, useful, and nonobvious). Inventor A
receives a patent having composition claims for shoe polish.
Indeed, the preamble of these hypothetical claims recites "a
composition for polishing shoes".... Suppose Inventor B
discovers that the polish also repels water when rubbed onto shoes.
Inventor B could not likely claim a method of using the polish to
repel water on shoes because repelling water is inherent in the
normal use of the polish to shine shoes.... In other words,
Inventor B has not invented a "new" use by rubbing polish on
shoes to repel water. Upon discovering, however, that the polish
composition grows hair when rubbed on bare human skin, Inventor
B can likely obtain method claims directed to the new use of the
composition to grow hair.
42
A few months after Catalina, the Federal Circuit in In re
Cruciferous Sprout Litigation43 found claims directed to methods of
preparing sprouts with certain properties anticipated by the sprouts
themselves. One patent claimed a method of preparing a food product
with many sprouts and rich in glucosinolates by harvesting the sprouts
prior to the two-leaf stage. Another patent claimed a method of
increasing the chemoprotective amount of Phase 2 enzymes in a
mammal by creating a food product from sprouts and administering it
to the mammal. The patent holders sued several broccoli farmers for
infringement. The district court found that the claim was anticipated
by prior art references disclosing growing and eating sprouts. The
district court concluded, "a plant (broccoli sprouts), long well known
in nature and cultivated and eaten by humans for decades, [cannot] be
patented merely on the basis of a recent realization that the plant has
always had some heretofore unknown but naturally occurring
beneficial feature.""
The Federal Circuit affirmed. The court began by noting that the
plaintiffs did "not claim to have invented a new kind of sprout, or a
new way of growing or harvesting sprouts," but rather had simply
recognized that some sprouts are high in glucosinolates and high in
Phase 2 enzyme-inducing activity while others are not.45 The court
pointed out, however, that the glucosinolates content and Phase 2
enzyme-inducing poteittial of sprouts "necessarily have existed as
long as the sprouts themselves," and are inherent characteristics of the
42. Id. at 809-10, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1786 (emphasis added).
43. 301 F.3d 1343, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
44. Id. at 1346, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1204 (internal quotations omitted).
45. Id. at 1350, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1207.
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sprout.46 The court also found it significant that numerous prior art
references identified those same sprouts as suitable for eating. 47 The
court emphasized that it was "unnecessary for purposes of
anticipation for the persons sprouting these particular cultivars to
have realized that they were sprouting something rich in
glucosinolates and high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential. '48 The
court concluded that "Brassica has done nothing more than recognize
properties inherent in certain prior art sprouts .... While Brassica may
have recognized something quite interesting, ... it simply has not
invented anything new.
4 9
C. Other Notable Cases
In Ex parte Novitski,5 ° claims were directed to "[a] method for
protecting a plant from plant pathogenic nematodes which comprises
46. Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, it was of no consequence that those of ordinary
skill heretofore had not recognized the claimed inherent characteristics of the sprouts. The court
cited an early Federal Circuit case which it found "particularly instructive in this regard." Id. In
Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the
claim at issue was directed to a titanium base alloy characterized by good corrosion resistance in
hot brine environments. The prior art disclosed a titanium base alloy having the recited
components of the claim, but did not disclose that such an alloy was "characterized by good
corrosion resistance in hot brine environments." Id. at 782, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 777-78. The
Federal Circuit nevertheless held that the claim was anticipated because it was immaterial what
inherent properties of the alloys the applicants discovered. In re Cruciferous, 301 F.3d at 1350,
164 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1207 (citing Titanium Metals Corp., 778 F.2d at 782, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 777-
78). The Titanium court noted, "Congress has not seen fit to permit the patenting of an old
alloy, known to others through a printed publication, by one who has discovered its corrosion
resistance or other useful properties." Titanium Metals Corp., 778 F.2d at 782, 227 U.S.P.Q. at
777-78.
47. In re Cruciferous, 301 F.3d at 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1208.
48. Id. In the recent case of Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Federal Circuit ruled that recognition by a person of
ordinary skill in the art is not required to show anticipation by inherency. The patent at issue,
U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716, covered a metabolite of the antihistamine loratadine called
desloratadine ("DCL"). DCL is a non-drowsy antihistamine that forms in the patient's body
upon ingestion of loratadine. A prior art patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,282,233, also issued to
Schering, disclosed loratadine. The district court found that the '233 patent inherently
anticipated the compound claims of the '716 patent because people who ingested loratadine
necessarily produced DCL, and therefore DCL was not a new result or product. Even though
the '233 patent did not expressly disclose DCL, the district court found that DCL was formed as
a metabolite by carrying out the process disclosed in the '233 patent. On appeal, the Federal
Circuit affirmed. After finding that the metabolite was formed under normal conditions in
readily detectable quantities, the court applied the longstanding patent principle that if
something would be an infringement after grant, it is an anticipation if it occurs before grant and
held that the prior production of the metabolite in patients taking loratadine was an anticipation
of the claim to the metabolite. Id.
49. In re Cruciferous, 301 F.3d at 1350-51,64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1208 (emphasis added).
50. 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1389, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993).
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the step of inoculating said plant with a nematode-inhibiting strain of
[Pseudomonas] cepacia which strain colonizes said plant." The
examiner rejected the claim as obvious in view of three references.
On appeal, the Board refused to sustain the obviousness rejection,
instead rejecting the claims on the alternative ground that they were
anticipated by one of the cited references, an issued U.S. patent to
Dart.51 Dart disclosed a method for protecting plants from fungal
disease by inoculating the plant with P. cepacia type Wisconsin 526
bacteria. Dart, however, did not expressly disclose that P. cepacia
type Wisconsin 526 bacteria possesses nematode-inhibiting activity,
nor did it expressly disclose a method for protecting a plant from
plant pathogenic nematodes. Nevertheless, the Board concluded that
nematode inhibition was an inherent property of the bacteria and that
"Dart's step of inoculating with Pseudomonas cepacia type
Wisconsin 526 inherently and necessarily constitutes a method for
protecting a plant from plant pathogenic nematodes. 52 The Board
continued:
[W]e find the conclusion inescapable that Pseudomonas cepacia
type Wisconsin 526 may be accurately classified and described
as "nematode-inhibiting". A fortiori, we find the conclusion
inescapable that Dart's method of inoculating a plant with
Pseudomonas cepacia type Wisconsin 526 constitutes a method of
inoculating with a nematode-inhibiting strain of Pseudomonas
cepacia as recited in independent claim 1 on appeal. Therefore,
we find that Dart's method constitutes a method for protecting a
plant from plant pathogenic nematodes as recited in claim 1 on
appeal. We fully 'appreciate that Dart does not disclose
appellants' claimed method in haec verba. Nevertheless, Dart's
disclosure fully meets the terms of the claimed method because
Pseudomonas cepacia type Wisconsin 526 inherently possesses
nematode-inhibiting activity.
53
In Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA,5 4 claims were
directed to a method of inhibiting animal cell proliferation comprising
contacting the cell with certain RGD peptides. A prior art reference
disclosed using the same peptides to interfere with the attachment of
rat kidney cells to certain substrates. Finding the claims anticipated
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1391.
54. 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
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by the prior art reference, 55 the district court noted that the
experiments conducted by plaintiffs which led to the application for
the '621 patent seemed to only have inquired into the results of using
the RGD peptides, but failed to alter the general method of using the
peptides as disclosed in the Nature article.56
The court observed that the entire basis of the '621 patent
appears to have been founded only upon "plaintiffs' extended
laboratory observations of the exact same Arg-Gly-Asp chemical
reactions on a variety of cells and substances. 57 The court held:
Regardless of the duration of plaintiffs' subsequent experiments,
the court finds that the manipulative steps described in the '621
Patent are substantially similar, if not identical to, the
steps disclosed in the Nature article such that plaintiffs subsequent
"discovery" that the same peptides specifically inhibited animal
cell proliferation was already inherent in the Nature paper and the
Nature paper thus anticipates the '621 Patent.
58
In finding the claim anticipated, the court cited to the Board's
holding in Novitski, noting that in that case, "the Board determined
that the result of the method Novitski sought to patent (namatode [sic]
inhibition) was already inherent in the steps described in a previous
patent granted to Dart.",59 The court noted that in Novitski, had Dart
taken the manipulative steps described in his patent (inoculating
plants with a particular bacteria), and then attempted to measure for
the results described by Novitski (nematode inhibition), he would
have uncovered it. 60  "Similarly here, if the authors of the Nature
publication had taken the additional steps necessary to measure and
locate the effects of certain RGD peptides on cell proliferation in a
variety of cellular contexts, they would have uncovered it."
61
55. The relevant portion of Integra Life Sciences was affirmed by the Federal Circuit on
appeal. See Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA, 331 F.3d 860, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865 (2003) (cert. filed March 2004).
56. Integra Life Sciences, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1850 (emphasis added).
57. Id (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 1851 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1851 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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II. INTENT Is NOT AN ELEMENT OF INFRINGEMENT
In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,62 the
Federal Circuit, acting en banc, held that for purposes of infringement
it is irrelevant whether an alleged infringer intends to infringe a
claimed method or not. In that case, the PTO had rejected Hilton
Davis' claim to a process for purifying commercial dyes over a prior
art reference which disclosed a similar process at pH level above nine.
In response, Hilton Davis amended the claims to include a pH range
of six to nine, and the PTO granted the patent. Hilton Davis then sued
Warner-Jenkinson, which employed a similar process at pH levels
below six, asserting that under the doctrine of equivalents, the claim
should be read broadly enough to encompass operation below the
claimed pH limit. Indeed, while the upper value of the claimed range,
pH of nine, was clearly needed to distinguish the prior art, there
appeared to be no reason from the record for limiting the lower value
of the range to a pH of six. The district court agreed with Hilton
Davis and found that Warner-Jenkinson infringed the patent. 63
The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.64 Relying on earlier
precedent, the court held:
Intent is not an element of infringement.... This question [of
infringement] is one irrespective of motive. The defendant may
have infringed without intending, or even knowing it; but he is not,
on that account, the less an infringer. His motives and knowledge
may affect the question of damages, to swell or reduce them; but
the immediate question is the simple one, has he infringed?
65
In particular, the court cited to Intel Corp. v. United States
International Trade Commission, which just a few years earlier had
held that "there is no intent element to direct infringement. 66
62. 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'don other grounds,
520 U.S. 17,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
63. Id. at 1516, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1643.
64. Id. at 1525, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1646. The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable
doctrine in patent law designed to prevent infringers from escaping liability simply by making
insubstantial changes. The Supreme Court has expressed the doctrine this way: "If two devices
do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result,
they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (citation omitted).
65. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1646 (emphasis added) (quoting
Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1143 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740).
66. 946 F.2d 821, 832, 20 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis in
original).
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, Warner-Jenkinson was
reversed on other grounds. 67 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld
the Federal Circuit's determination that intent plays no role in an
infringement analysis, holding "[a]pplication of the doctrine of
equivalents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and
neither requires proof of intent.,68 Indeed, just two years later, in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,69 the Supreme Court reaffirmed this basic principle:
"Actions predicated on direct patent infringement, however, do not
require any showing of intent to infringe; instead, knowledge and
intent are considered only with respect to damages. 70
The Federal Circuit recently reiterated the holdings in Warner-
Jenkinson and Florida Prepaid. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Mee
Industries, Inc.,71 the court held that the motive of an accused
infringer is irrelevant to the determination of infringement. In Dow,
the patentee claimed a method for augmenting the net output of a gas
turbine comprising a number of steps including adding increasing
amounts of water to the compressor. The purpose of this method, as
set forth in the body of the claim, was "to avoid destructive thermal
stresses within the. gas turbine which are related to the providing of
increased amounts of liquid water to the working fluid., 72  The
alleged infringer carried out the same steps, but did not do so for the
claimed purpose of avoiding thermal stresses. The Federal Circuit
noted that the issue was not whether the accused intended to avoid
thermal stresses in employing the claimed method, but rather whether
he did avoid such stresses.73 Citing to Warner-Jenkinson, the court
held that even if the accused carried out the process "for an entirely
different reason, that would not avoid infringement, as the motive of
the accused infringer when performing a claimed method is simply
not relevant."
74
67. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865 (1997).
68. Id. at 35, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1873 (emphasis added).
69. 527 U.S. 627,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (1999).
70. Id. at 645, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1089 (emphasis added); see also 5 DONALD S. CHISUM,
PATENTS § 16.0212], p. 16-31 (rev. ed. 1998). Professor Chisum noted, "It is, of course,
elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without
knowledge of the patent." Id. (citation omitted).
71. 341 F.3d 1370, 1379, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 1375, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1180.
73. Id. at 1380, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1184.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
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III. THESE Two PRINCIPLES ARE Two SIDES OF THE SAME COIN
The principle espoused in Warner-Jenkinson, Florida Prepaid
and Dow, that the motive of an accused infringer when performing a
claimed method is irrelevant, is wholly consistent with the principle
discussed in section I, that a claim directed to a method of using an
old composition to achieve a result or property inherent in that
composition is unpatentable. Indeed, as we shall see, these two
principles are really one and the same.
Let us return to the hypothetical described in the Introduction.
The claim at issue is directed to a method of using a known
composition (compound X). The method recites the exact same steps
as a prior art method of using compound X to treat arthritis, but the
preamble states that it is a "method of treating near-sightedness."
This claim may be viewed in one of two ways. It may be viewed as
anticipated under the general rule that a claimed use of an old
composition to achieve a result or property inherenily possessed by
that compound is unpatentable. This is similar to the conclusion
reached by numerous courts, e.g., Cruciferous, Eli Lilly, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, May, Tomlinson, and Novitski. In this regard, Inventor
2 has indeed discovered a heretofore unrecognized and interesting
property of compound X (effectiveness at treating near-sightedness).
Nevertheless, this property, while newly discovered by Inventor 2, is
not a new property of the compound.
Alternatively, the hypothetical claim may be viewed as
anticipated under the Warner-Jenkinson rule. Recall that Warner-
Jenkinson prohibits taking intent into account when determining
whether a claim has been infringed. Since infringement and
anticipation analyses are the same,75 the rule of disregarding intent
when determining whether a claim is infringed should apply with
equal force when determining whether a claim is anticipated.
Accordingly, merely stating a different objective or purpose (treating
near-sightedness) should not render the hypothetical claim patentably
distinct over the prior art method, which uses the same composition in
the same way but for a different purpose (treating arthritis). 76 Thus,
75. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("IT]hat which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates
if earlier." (citations omitted)); see also Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889).
76. After all, if merely stating a different objective were all that was required for
patentability, every known method using a composition for a previously unclaimed purpose
would potentially be patentable.
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the claimed method would be anticipated by the prior art method,
which performs all of the same steps.
It is important to bear in mind that, prior to Inventor 2's
discovery that compound X treats near-sightedness, near-sighted
individuals taking compound X to treat their arthritis were necessarily
also treating their nearsightedness, regardless of whether they
intended to do so or not. Thus, if Inventor 2 were issued a claim
covering the use of compound X to treat near-sightedness, it would
effectively remove from the public domain that which had already
existed. Moreover, the granting of such a claim has anomalous
consequences. For instance, an arthritic patient taking compound X
intending to treat his arthritis would not be an infringer, but an
arthritic patient taking compound X intending to treat his near-
sightedness (or both his arthritis and his near-sightedness) would be
an infringer. In this scenario, the issue of infringement would turn on
what each patient was intending or thinking at the moment they took
compound X.
It is readily apparent that the two views of the hypothetical
method are two sides of the same coin. Consistent with Warner-
Jenkinson's rule against taking intent into consideration when
interpreting claims is the rule that, to patent a method of using
compound X to treat near-sightedness, Inventor 2 would have to
recite a new or different use of compound X. Merely stating a
different purpose (i.e., to treat near-sightedness) is really no different
than reciting a previously unrecognized result (i.e., treatment of near-
sightedness), and neither is enough for patentability. Rather, Inventor
2 must insert a limitation in the claim which requires some
manipulative step be performed which was not disclosed in the prior
art.77 For instance, Inventor 2 could patent a "method of treating
near-sightedness, comprising rinsing the eyes of a near-sighted patient
with a solution comprising 100 mg of compound X." In this case, the
use of compound X is not anticipated by Inventor l's patent-or,
alternatively stated, does not infringe Inventor 1's patent-because it
recites a limitation (applying a 100 mg solution to the eyes of a near-
sighted patient) not disclosed expressly or inherently by Inventor 1.
77. See, e.g., Integra Life Sciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846,
1850-51 (S.D. Cal. 1999) ("Regardless of the duration of plaintiffs' subsequent experiments,
the court finds that the manipulative steps described in the '621 Patent are substantially similar,
if not identical to, the steps disclosed in the Nature article such that plaintiffs' subsequent
"discovery" that the same peptides specifically inhibited animal cell proliferation was already
inherent in the Nature paper and the Nature paper thus anticipates the '621 Patent." (emphasis
added)).
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The next section analyzes a recent Federal Circuit case which
held that an alleged infringer's intent is determinative on the issue of
patentability of a claimed method of using a known composition. The
section points out the flaws in the court's analysis, and how the
decision contradicts Federal Circuit precedent discussed above. In
particular, the section highlights the anomalous consequences that
result from taking intent into account when determining whether an
alleged infringer has infringed a method of use claim.
IV. JANSEN V. REXALL SUNDOWN
A. Facts of the Case
In Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,78 Jansen was the sole inventor
and owner of U.S. Patent No. 4,945,083, directed to methods of
"'treating or preventing macrocytic-megaloblastic anemia' [MMA] by
administering a combination of folic acid and vitamin B 12 'to a human
in need thereof."'' 79 According to the patent, deficiencies of either
folic acid or vitamin B12 can cause MMA, and an objective of
Jansen's invention was to administer both supplements together to
avoid the masking problem.80  During prosecution of the patent,
Jansen was forced to limit his claims to a specific type of anemia,
MMA, rather than anemia in general, and had to add to the claim the
phrase "to a human in need thereof.",
8 1
Rexall marketed a non-prescription dietary supplement that
contained folic acid and vitamin B 12 within the claimed ranges, but
which was labeled and advertised "for maintenance of proper blood
homocysteine levels," but not for prevention or treatment of MMA.
82
Arguing that all people are "humans in need of treatment or
prevention of MMA," Jansen sued Rexall for indirect infringement
83based on alleged direct infringement by Rexall's customers. The
district court rejected Jansen's argument, and construed the phrase
"treating or preventing [MMA]" to require that the human subject of
the claimed method take the compound with the intent of treating or
preventing MMA. 84  The district court found no evidence of such
78. 342 F.3d 1329, 1330, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1154, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
79. Id. at 1330, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1155.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1331, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1156.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
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intent or purpose on the part of Rexall's customers, and granted
summary judgment to Rexall.
On appeal, Jansen argued that the district court improperly added
to the claims an intent element, which is contrary to the law, the
ordinary meaning of the claims, and the prosecution history of the
patent.85 Jansen also argued that the phrase "a human in need
thereof' encompasses a person who does not know his or her serum
levels of folic acid and vitamin B 12 are adequate. 86 Rexall responded
that, to the extent the district court's claim construction added an
intent element to the claims, it was required to do so by the particular
language of the claims themselves.87 Rexall also argued that the
claims should be interpreted to require that the target group (humans
in need thereof) practice the method for the stated purpose (treating or
preventing MMA), especially since the both limitations were added
for patentability.88 According to Rexall, a "human in need thereof' is
someone either suffering from MMA or at a recognized risk, such as
by medical diagnosis, of developing that condition.8 9
B. Federal Circuit Opinion
The court began its claim construction analysis by citing to an
earlier case, Rapoport v. Dement,90 which involved an interference
count reciting a "method for treatment of sleep apneas comprising
administration of a therapeutically effective [amount of buspirone] to
a patient in need of such treatment." 9' Rapoport had argued that, as to
Dement, the count was anticipated by a reference Rapoport had
authored, directed to treating anxiety in patients suffering from sleep
apnea with 10 mg of buspirone three times a day. The Federal Circuit
upheld the Board's granting of priority to Dement. The court
interpreted the count's preamble, "A method for treatment of sleep
apneas," as limited to treating the underlying sleep apnea disorder,
and not to symptoms of that disorder such as anxiety.92 The court
stated, "There is no disclosure in the [reference] of tests in which





90. 254 F.3d 1053, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
91. Id. at 1055, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1217.
92. Id. at 1060, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1220.
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buspirone is administered to patients suffering from sleep apnea with
the intent to cure the underlying condition."
93
Citing Rapoport, the court in Jansen noted that the claim
preamble sets forth the objective of the method, and the claim's
recitation of a human "in need" gives life and meaning to the
preamble's statement of purpose. 94 "The preamble is therefore not
merely a statement of effect that may or may not be desired or
appreciated. Rather, it is a statement of the intentional purpose for
which the method must be performed."95 The court continued:
Finally, that "need" must be recognized and appreciated, for
otherwise the added phrases do not carry the meaning that the
circumstances of their addition suggest that they carry. In other
words, administering the claimed vitamins in the claimed doses for
some purpose other than treating or preventing macrocytic-
megaloblastic anemia is not practicing the claimed method,
because Jansen limited his claims to treatment or prevention of that
particular condition in those who need such treatment or
prevention. Thus, the '083 patent claims are properly interpreted
to mean that the combination of folic acid and vitamin B12 must be
administered to a human with a recognized need to treat or prevent
macrocytic-megaloblastic anemia.
96
The court demurred deciding whether it would reach the same
conclusion if either of the "treating or preventing" phrase or the "to a
human in need thereof' phrase was not a part of the claim.97 The
court also noted that its claim construction was supported by the
prosecution history, which revealed that both phrases were added to
the claim in order to gain allowance.98
Despite the court's favorable claim construction, it nevertheless
held that Jansen's evidence of direct infringement was too speculative
to support an indirect infringement claim against Rexall since
Rexall's customers were not shown to have taken the product
"knowingly to treat or prevent" the anemia in question.99 The court
93. Id. at 1061, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1221 (emphasis added). The court observed, for
example, that the reference mentioned the possibility of administering buspirone to patents
suffering from sleep apnea only "for the purpose of treating anxiety in such patients, not for the
purpose of treating the sleep apnea disorder itself." Id.
94. Jansen, 342 F.3d at 1333, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1158.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 1334, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1158 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1158-59 (emphasis added).
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concluded, "[u]se of an over-the-counter product like Rexall's is quite
different from the use of a product pursuant to a prescription from a
medical doctor. In the latter case, a prescription is evidence of a
diagnosis and a knowing need to use the product for the stated
purpose."'
00
C. Flaws in Jansen 's Analysis
In Jansen, the Federal Circuit departed from the general rule that
a claim directed to using an old composition to achieve a result or
property inherent in that composition is unpatentable. The court
distinguished a claimed method of using a composition over an
allegedly infringing use by lending patentable weight to the stated
objective of the claimed method in order to distinguish the claim from
the allegedly infringing use. The court's strained claim construction
and subsequent analysis are flawed for several reasons.
1. Court Disregarded Precedent That Intent Is Irrelevant
Jansen stands for the proposition that, where a claimed method
states a specific objective (e.g., treating or preventing a disease with
compound X), intending to meet that objective (e.g., taking compound
X intending to treat or prevent the disease) is a prerequisite to a
finding of anticipation or infringement. This conclusion, purportedly
adopted from Rapoport,'0 ' is directly at odds with both Federal
Circuit and Supreme Court precedent discussed above, which holds
that an alleged infringer's intent when performing a claimed method
is irrelevant to the question of infringement.'
0 2
2. Court Placed Too Much Emphasis on Holding in
Rapoport
Jansen's holding that a statement of purpose sufficiently
distinguishes a claimed method over an allegedly infringing use of the
same method for an unrelated purpose is without precedent. Holding
that the preamble was a statement of intentional purpose for which the
method must be performed, the court cited to Rapoport. It should be
100. Id. at 1334-35, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1159 (emphasis added).
101. See Rapoport v. Dement, 254 F.3d 1053, 1060-61, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215, 1221
(Fed. Cir. 2001). Even if Rapoport, properly interpreted, stands for the proposition that a prior
art reference anticipates a method claim only if it is directed to the same purpose, that court
cited no authority for such a proposition.
102. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
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noted, however, that the facts of Rapoport were quite distinct from
those of Jansen. In Rapoport, the court upheld the Board's
interpretation of the preamble "treatment of sleep apneas" as limited
to reducing the frequency and severity of apnea during sleep.'0 3 The
court noted that there was nothing in the alleged anticipatory
reference of administering busipirone to patients suffering from sleep
apnea "with the intent to cure the underlying condition."
10 4
If the Rapoport court had ended its anticipation analysis there,
the case might have been cited for the correct proposition. However,
the Rapoport court did not base its holding of non-anticipation solely
on the fact that the count recited a different objective (treating sleep
apnea) than that disclosed by the p ior art reference (treating anxiety
in patients with sleep apnea). Rather, the court pointed to the fact that
the reference had only proposed treating anxiety in patients with sleep
apnea, and that in fact there was nothing in the reference which
suggested that busipirone had ever actually been administered to
patients with sleep apnea. 10 5 The court added that the reference did
not teach administering busipirone at bedtime, which was an implicit
limitation of the count (treating sleep apnea), nor did it teach
administering an effective amount of busipirone to treat sleep
apnea. 106 Finally, the court emphasized that the issue of anticipation
is a question of fact, and that decisions of the Board on factual matters
are to be upheld if there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the Board's findings. 1
0 7
Thus, Rapoport had been able to establish only that conditions
identical to those claimed were possible in view of the prior art. This
did not give rise to the level of certainty necessary for inherency.
This was very different from the facts in Jansen, in which it was
undisputed that, although they may not have recognized it at the time,
individuals had necessarily been treated for MMA with the prior art
method.
103. Rapoport, 254 F.3d at 1060, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1220.
104. Id. at 1061, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1221.
105. Id (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1061-62 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 1063, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1222 ("Most importantly, however.., the issue of
anticipation-whether by inherency or otherwise-is a question of fact, and we uphold the
decisions of the Board on factual matters if there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the Board's findings.").
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3. Different Panel Reached Opposite Conclusion on
Analogous Facts
Another disturbing aspect of Jansen is that just three days earlier
a different panel of the Federal Circuit in Dow Chemical Co. v. Mee
Industries, Inc.,' °8 held that the motive of an accused infringer is
irrelevant. As was the case in Jansen, the accused in Dow carried out
the same steps as the claimed method, but did not do so for the
claimed purpose of avoiding thermal stresses. Properly citing to
Warner-Jenkinson as controlling precedent, Dow held that even if the
accused carried out the process "for an entirely different reason, that
would not avoid infringement, as the motive of the accused infringer
when performing a claimed method is simply not relevant."'10 9
Referring back to Jansen, one could state by analogy that the
issue was not whether the purchaser of the vitamin formulation
intended to prevent MMA, but rather whether he did prevent MMA
by carrying out the claimed process. It is difficult to see how Jansen
can be reconciled with Dow or with Warner-Jenkinson.
V. JANsEN HIGHLIGHTS THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE Two PRINCIPLES
The discovery of a new result or property of a known
composition, while not devoid of patentable protection, should only
be protected through careful drafting and consideration of what did
and did not previously exist, and how something that previously
existed was previously used.110  For instance, a discoverer of a
previously unrecognized property in compound X could obtain
protection for a method of using the compound by inserting into the
claim a limitation directed to administering the compound in a
manner, to a location, or in an amount previously undisclosed by the
prior art. Such a claim would constitute a new "use" of compound X.
Referring back to Jansen, recall that the court found a claimed
method of using a vitamin B 12 preparation to treat or prevent MMA
was not infringed by Rexall, which manufactured and marketed the
same vitamin preparation for "maintenance of proper blood
homocysteine levels.""' According to the patent maxim that "that
108. 341 F.3d 1370,68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
109. Id. at 1380, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1184 (emphasis added).
110. See also Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1374-78, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667-69 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
111. Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 1331, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1154,
1156 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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which infringes, if later, anticipates if earlier,"'1 12 presumably the
court's analysis would have been the same had the procedural posture
been one of anticipation, rather than infringement. In other words,
had Rexall attempted to patent a "method of maintaining proper blood
homocysteine levels" by administering the vitamin B12 preparation,
the court would have held such a claim patentably distinguished over
Jansen's claimed method of treating MMA because the claim's
recitation of maintaining proper blood homocysteine levels is "a
statement of intentional purpose for which the method must be
performed."'"13
The conclusion reached by Jansen leads to the anomalous result
that an individual taking the claimed vitamin B12 preparation
intending to maintain proper blood homocysteine levels would not be
an infringer, but an individual taking the same preparation in the same
way intending to treat his or her MMA would be an infringer.
114
Indeed, the court rested its decision of non-infringement on the fact
that Jansen's evidence was too speculative because Rexall's
customers were not shown to have taken the vitamin B 2 preparation
"knowingly to treat or prevent" MMA. 115 The court drew a dubious
distinction between products purchased over-the-counter versus
products purchased with a prescription. According to the court, an
individual performing the claimed method with a product obtained
pursuant to a prescription would be an infringer because the
prescription is indicative of a knowing need to use the product for the
claimed purpose. On the other hand, an individual performing the
claimed method with a product obtained over-the-counter would not
be an infringer because there is no proof of the purpose for which the
individual is using the product.
Following the reasoning of Jansen, the issue of infringement
turns on what each individual is intending or thinking the moment
they used the vitamin B 2 preparation. Thus, in order to prove
infringement, Jansen would presumably have had to produce proof
112. See Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889); see, e.g., Schering Corp.,
339 F.3d at 1379.
113. See Jansen, 342 F.3d at 1331-33, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1158.
114. See Robert M. Schulman, A Review of Significant 2003 Federal Circuit Decisions
Affecting Chemical, Pharmaceutical, and Biotech Inventions, 16 No. 3 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 1,
1 (2004) (criticizing Jansen for leading to a "situation where two individuals taking the same
accused vitamins at the same place at the same time do not both infringe the method if one of
those individuals has 'a recognized need' for treatment or prevention of MMA whereas the
second is taking the vitamins for another reason.").
115. Jansen, 342 F.3d at 1334, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1158-59 (emphasis added).
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that the individual was thinking about treating MMA the moment he
or she performed the claimed method. As discussed above, this
holding squarely contradicts Warner-Jenkinson, which wisely
avoided any inquiry into an alleged infringer's state of mind when
performing a claimed method.
It should be noted that the Jansen panel could have reached the
same outcome without running afoul of Federal Circuit precedent.
Instead of construing the phrase "in need thereof' as imposing an
intent requirement, the panel could have construed the phrase more
broadly. For instance, every human is potentially a person "in need"
of treatment or prevention of MMA. Thus, the claim could have been
construed as encompassing the administration of the vitamin
preparation to all individuals. The court acknowledges this: "In this
case, the 'treating or preventing [MMA]' phrase and the 'to a human
in need thereof phrase were added to gain allowance of the claims
after almost twenty years of repeatedly unsuccessful attempts to gain
allowance of claims without those phrases."
'' 16
Had the panel correctly construed the claim as encompassing the
administration of the vitamin preparation to all individuals (and not
just those with a recognized need of treatment or prevention of
MMA), it would have reached the same ultimate conclusion of non-
infringement without having to contradict years of CCPA and Federal
Circuit precedent. Thus, the real problem in Jansen was that the
Patent Office ("PTO") lent patentable weight to a meaningless intent
limitation to distinguish prior art. Instead of righting the PTO's
wrong, the panel compounded the error by engaging in a dubious
intent-driven infringement analysis to distinguish the intended use of
the claimed method from the alleged infringing use.
Indeed, applying the rationale discussed above, to have obtained
a patentable method of use in view of the prior art, Jansen should
have been required to add a limitation to the claim which required
some additional manipulative step. For instance, Jansen could have
patented a method of treating MMA comprising administering the
vitamin B12 preparation at a different concentration or via a different
delivery route (e.g., intravenously or topically) than that disclosed by
the prior art. This claim would have distinguished the prior art and
would ostensibly have covered any individual using the vitamin B12
preparation in the claimed manner, regardless of the individual's
intent when using it. Such a result is consistent with the patent
principles discussed herein and provides the appropriate level of
116. Id at 1333, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1158.
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patent protection commensurate in scope with the patentee's
invention.
CONCLUSION
Language in a method of use claim that simply recites a result or
property of a known composition ought not distinguish that claim
from a prior art reference disclosing the very same use of that
composition with a different result. The claim should be viewed as
inherently anticipated by the reference, notwithstanding that the
reference did not recognize all the imaginable results of using the
composition. Similarly, the claim should not be construed as
requiring the user to intend to achieve the previously unrecognized
result in order to distinguish the claim over the art or an allegedly
infringing use. Such strained claim construction invariably runs afoul
of the general prohibition against taking into account the motive of an
accused infringer (or alleged anticipatory reference) when performing
a claimed method. To the extent that Jansen v. Rexall Sundown is
contrary to the general principles discussed in this Article, the Federal
Circuit ought to distinguish and/or overrule it.
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